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The Third

Levinas’ theoretical move from an-archical ethics to the realm of justice and politics

Abstract  Emmanuel Levinas’ radical heteronomous ethics has received a great deal of scholarly attention. However, his political thought remains relatively neglected. This essay shows how Levinas moves from the an-archical, ethical relationship with the Other to the totalizing realm of politics with his phenomenology of the third person, the Third. With the appearance of the Third, the ego must respond to more than one Other. It must decide whom to respond to first. This decision leads the ego from the an-archical, ethical realm to the realm of politics. Although the Third universalizes the an-archical relationship with the Other into the political realm, it does not supplant the original ethical relationship. Instead, there is a never-ending oscillation between ethics and politics. The world of institutions and impersonal justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice.

Key words  Derrida · ethics · Levinas · liberalism · the Other · politics · responsibility · said · saying · the Third

Since the publication of his ground-breaking work *Totality and Infinity* in 1961, the Franco-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has gradually become recognized as one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century. Levinas is best known for establishing a heteronomous ethics, that is, an ethics based on the other person, the Other, and not the self. According to Levinas, when approached by the face of the Other, the ego no longer strives for self-preservation, but rather is called to a
non-ontological ethical responsibility. Although a plethora of works discuss Levinas’ ethical and metaphysical theories, very little research has been done on his political thought.³

This article will show how Levinas’ radical, heteronomous ethics can be extended to the political realm. In fact, the theoretical structures of Levinas’ ethics serve as a paradigm for his political theory. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas’ ethics hinged upon the dual structure of separation and relation found in Plato’s discussions of eros or desire. In his second major work, *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas’ ethics hinged upon the oscillation between the saying and the said. Both of these theoretical structures will be shown to be pivotal for Levinasian politics, in particular the relationship between ethics and politics.

The first section of this article will briefly develop Levinas’ ethical thought focusing on these theoretical structures. Second, it must be demonstrated that Levinas’ thought is not apolitical even though he is deeply suspicious of traditional political thought. Third, Levinas’ phenomenology of the Third person, ‘the Third’ (*le tiers*) will be presented as his theoretical move from ethics to politics.⁴ Although the Third universalizes the an-archical relationship with the Other into politics, it does not supplant the original ethical relationship with the Other. Instead, there is a never-ending oscillation between ethics and politics. This oscillation is discussed in the fourth section of the article. The final section describes the Levinasian state which balances the demands of both ethics and politics.

**Levinas’ an-archical ethics**

In *Totality and Infinity* Levinas searched for a new philosophical justification for the ethical relationship with the Other. Levinas argued that an adequate ethics can be found only in transcendence, but the predominant traditions in philosophy have erected totalizing systems which subordinate all elements of transcendence. Totalizing philosophies are grounded in an arche, usually a neuter term, like Being, spirit, reason, or history, which is declared to be the origin and guiding principle of reality. Philosophers desire to comprehend all experience through this neuter term. Metaphysics is reduced to ontology and thus philosophy is merely a battle between competing theories of being, literally an ‘ontologomachy’. Even theologians subordinate the divine to a neuter term ‘by expressing it with adverbs of height applied to the verb being; God is said to exist eminently or par excellence’.⁵ The transcendent can be subordinated because all objects are reduced to a thing, and as a thing they can be com-prehended or grasped. Whatever is other can always be reduced to the Same; thus, there is nothing beyond the grasp of the Same.
Although relative alterity, that is, qualitative differences between objects, may remain, radical alterity or transcendence is destroyed.

How is it possible to break the stranglehold of ontology? How can transcendence be rediscovered in the Western tradition? How can Levinas claim that ethics and not ontology deserves to be labeled ‘first philosophy’? According to Levinas, the face-to-face relationship with the other person, the Other, is beyond the grasp of ontology. The face cannot be totalized because it expresses infinitude. In other words, the ego can never totally know the Other. In fact, the Other exists prior to the subject and ontology: the Other comes from the immemorial past.

How can Levinas reject the Cartesian hypothesis and claim that the relationship with the Other is primary? How can the relationship with the Other precede my being? How can the Other be an-archical? In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas develops his an-archical ethics by reviving the Platonic distinction between need and eros or desire. A need is a privation which can be sated, but a desire cannot be satisfied. The ego satisfies its needs, and remains within itself, by appropriating the world. ‘Need opens upon a world that is for-me; it returns to the self... . It is an assimilation of the world in view of coincidence with oneself, or happiness.’ As the desired is approached, on the other hand, the hunger increases. It pulls the ego away from its self-sufficiency. Thus, needs belong to the realm of the Same, while desires pull the ego away from the Same and toward the beyond. Nonetheless, desires also originate in an ego who longs for the unattainable. Therefore, desire has a dual structure of transcendence and interiority. This dual structure includes an absolutely Other, the desired, which cannot be consumed and an ego who is preserved in this relationship with the transcendent. Thus, there is both a relationship and a separation.

According to Levinas, this structure of desire is triggered by the approach of the Other. The ego strives to com-prehend, literally, to grasp the Other, but is unable. The Other expresses an infinitude which cannot be reduced to ontological categories. The ego is pulled out of itself toward the transcendent. This inability to com-prehend the Other calls the ego and its self-sufficiency into question. Have I, merely by existing, already usurped the place of another? Am I somehow responsible for the death of the Other? The face calls the ego to respond before any unique knowledge about the Other. The approach of the human Other breaks the ego away from a concern for its own existence; with the appearance of the Other, *Dasein* is no longer a creature concerned with its own being.

What I want to emphasize is that the human breaks with pure being, which is always a persistence in being. **This is my principal thesis.** The being of animals is a struggle for life. A struggle for life without ethics. It is a question of might. Heidegger says at the beginning of *Being and Time* that
Dasein is a being who in his being is concerned for this being itself. That’s Darwin’s idea: the living being struggles for life. The aim of being is being itself. However, with the appearance of the human – and this is my entire philosophy – there is something more important than my life, and that is the life of the other.8

The face as pure expression calls the ego to respond, to do something to justify its existence. However, Levinas’ theory of responsibility does not call for the annihilation of the ego. Levinasian responsibility maintains the dual structure of desire; that is, it questions the privileged place of the Same, but it keeps the ego intact, albeit in a subordinate position. Without a responsible self, responsibility would lose its meaning.

Levinas furnishes a new way to think about responsibility: the ego does not choose to answer the Other’s demand; to be human, it must respond to the Other. Responsibility is so extreme that it is the very definition of subjectivity, the ego is subject to the Other. ‘The I is not simply conscious of this necessity to respond . . . rather the I is, by its very position, responsibility through and through’.9 This primordial, an-archical responsibility is concrete, infinite, and asymmetrical.

A relationship with the infinite cannot be used as an excuse not to care about the world. My responsibility for the Other must be expressed in a concrete way, with ‘full hands’. Levinas often cites a Jewish proverb: ‘The other’s material needs are my spiritual needs.’10 Thus, Levinas’ ethics demand concrete hospitality for the Other, be it the stranger, the widow, or the orphan.

What are the limits of this responsibility? According to Levinas, the face of the Other calls the ego to respond infinitely. The ego cannot comfortably rest from this responsibility. ‘At no time can one say: I have done all my duty. Except the hypocrite.’11 Just like desire, the more I respond to the Other, the more I am responsible. Responsibility is so extreme that the ego is responsible for the Other’s responsibility. Levinas often cites Alyosha Karamazov as an example of this infinite responsibility. Alyosha boldly claims that ‘each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and for each one, and I more than others.’12

Is the Other also infinitely responsible for the ego? Is the ethical relationship symmetrical? No, Levinas calls for a radical asymmetry. The Other may be responsible for the ego, but that is his own affair. ‘I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it . . . The I always has one responsibility more than all the others.’13 Without this asymmetry ethics would lose its meaning because ethics, for Levinas, must be grounded in the beyond Being. Ethics requires the ego to be radically dis-interested.14 The ego cannot demand reciprocity.

The Oscar-winning movie Schindler’s List nicely illustrates Levinasian responsibility. Oskar Schindler, a member of the Nazi party, has
profited during the Second World War through the exploitation of Jewish slave labor. When he becomes aware of the atrocities committed by the Nazis, Schindler vows to save as many Jews as possible. Before his factory workers are disbanded and sent to Auschwitz for extermination, Schindler bribes the Nazi officers to allow him to export them to a factory in Czechoslovakia. Thus, Schindler was able to save over one thousand Jews. For his actions, he was given a plaque in the Park of Heroes in Tel Aviv and declared a Righteous Person by the state of Israel.

Although he had saved so many, Schindler had not done enough. As he fulfilled his responsibilities, so his responsibilities grew. Near the end of the movie, Schindler understands that all the money he had spent previously has prevented him from buying the lives of a few more Jews. By eating, drinking, and taking shelter, Schindler has usurped the place of the Other.

SCHINDLER I could have got more out. I could have got more. I don’t know, if I’d just . . . I could have got more.

ITZHAK STERN Oskar, there are eleven hundred people alive because of you. Look at them! . . . There will be generations because of what you did.

SCHINDLER I didn’t do enough.

STERN You did so much.

SCHINDLER This car! Goeth would’ve bought this car. Why did I keep the car? Ten people right there. Ten people. Ten more people. This pin: two people. This is gold: two more people. He would’ve given me two for it – at least one, he would’ve given me one. One more person. A person who’s dead. For this! (crying) I could’ve got one more person and I didn’t – and I didn’t!15

Otherwise than Being

In Otherwise than Being, Levinas re-formulated his ethical foundations in response to criticisms by Jacques Derrida.16 In particular, Levinas clarified the difference between the expression of the face and the ontological language which Derrida claims is violent. Levinas concurs with Derrida: language, as it is usually conceived, is thematizing and thus violent to the transcendent Other.

Levinas reintroduces the face-to-face relation with the Other, but changes his focus and his terminology. Instead of the infinitude of the face, Levinas concentrates on the moment of transcendence that is experienced in the encounter. In particular, how does the expression of the face differ from ontological discourse? Levinas calls the former ‘the
saying’, while he calls the latter ‘the said’. The expression of the face is a saying, which exists prior to any linguistic concepts, which are fundamental to the said.

The distinction between the saying and the said is best understood in juxtaposition to traditional theories of expression. In the traditional view, language originates with the speaker. The speaker intends to speak, formulates thoughts into words, then expresses them. The ego is pre-eminent. Levinas, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of the addressee. The focus is thus shifted from the ego to the Other. ‘The activity of speaking robs the subject of its central position; it is the depositing of a subject without refuge. The speaking subject is no longer by and for itself; it is for the other.’

The traditional view of expression emphasizes the content of the communication, the said. In the realm of the said, the speaker assigns meanings to objects and ideas. It is a process of identification, a kerygmatics, a designating, a process of labeling ‘a this as that’. This is the realm of totality and autonomy, ‘a tradition in which intelligibility derives from the assembling of terms united in a system for a locutor that states an apophansis... Here the subject is origin, initiative, freedom, present.’

The realm of the said overlooks the most important aspect of communication, the Other. Prior to the speech act, the speaker must address the Other, and before the address is the approach of the Other or proximity. Before any speech, before any intention to speak, there is an ‘exposure of the ego to the other, the non-indifference to another’, which is not a simple ‘intention to address a message’. The saying includes not only the content of the speech, but the process itself which includes the Thou who is addressed and the speaker as attendant to the spoken word.

The approach of the Other is non-thematizable, non-utterable, impossible because the saying is diachronous to the said. The realm of the said is a synchronic time where all of reality can be thematized and made present to the mind of the ego. This is the domain of Husserlian time, where time is a series of instants which can be re-presented in the consciousness of the ego. This synchronic, totalizing world is the world of Derrida’s violent language. The saying, on the other hand, ‘is the impossibility of the dispersion of time to assemble itself in the present, the insurmountable diachrony of time, a beyond the said’. The saying comes from a time before the time of Being, and is thus irreducible to ontology. It is the past that was never present.

While the said emphasizes the autonomous position of the ego, the saying tears the ego from its lair. In the saying, the ego is more than just exposed to the Other, it is assigned to the Other. Assignation supplants identification. ‘The one assigned has to open to the point of separating itself from its own inwardness, adhering to esse; it must be
dis-interestedness. The saying is a de-posing or de-situating of the ego. Thus, the saying is otherwise than Being.

From this new, non-ontological foundation, Levinas continues to extol a responsibility that is concrete, infinite and asymmetrical. Responsibility must be concrete because the ego is not called to respond from a transcendent being or ideal imperative, but from the approach of an incarnate Other. The subject who responds is also an incarnate being, who can only respond with concrete hospitality. This hospitality is so extreme that the ego must be ‘capable of giving the bread out of his mouth, or giving his skin’.

Starting from the an-archical saying Levinas has re-developed his ethical philosophy. Before any ontological proofs, before any intentional actions, the ego is responsible for the Other. As in *Totality and Infinity*, responsibility maintains the dual structure of desire: separation and relation. Although the world of the saying is originary, Levinas does not abolish the important place held by the ontological said. The saying requires the said. For instance, to communicate the saying, indeed, to write *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas must employ the said. The saying

... must spread out and assemble itself into essence, posit itself, be hypostatized, become an eon in consciousness and knowledge, let itself be seen, undergo the ascendancy of being. Ethics itself, in its saying which is a responsibility requires this hold.

The an-archical saying must be thematized, but it should not be forgotten. Steps must be taken to maintain the potency of the ethical saying. According to Levinas, this is the proper, albeit neglected, duty of philosophy. Levinas by writing tomes is trying to unsay the said. Strangely enough, producing more said is the proper modality of unsaying. The task of the philosopher is ceaselessly to move backward to the time of the saying, to resay continually the said. This is a peculiar type of philosophical reduction.

The reduction is reduction of the said to the saying beyond the logos, beyond being and non-being, beyond essence, beyond true and non-true. It is the reduction to signification, to the one-for-the-other involved in responsibility (or more exactly in substitution), to the locus or non-lieu, locus and non-lieu, the utopia of the human.

To summarize, in *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas goes to great lengths to clarify the distinction between the saying and the said. This distinction is used on several different levels. Most simply, it is a direct answer to Derrida’s charge that the initial relationship with the Other is violent if it is based on language or discourse. More importantly, Levinas uses the relationship between the saying and the said, just as he earlier employed the Platonic concept of desire, as the paradigm for other aspects of his theory. The oscillating, but non-encompassing, relationship
between the saying and the said is extended to cover the relationships between philosophy and non-philosophy, Same and Other, ontology and ethics, autonomy and heteronomy, Hellenism and Judaism, and, most importantly for this article, ethics and politics. Each unit of the pair is mutually interdependent, but the second unit, although pre-original, has been neglected in the Western philosophical tradition, while the hegemonic first term has been unrestrained. Levinas seeks to restore balance to the pairs without ignoring either.

For instance, ethics, which is a manifestation of the saying, has been subordinated by politics, a manifestation of the said. Ethics must be resuscitated to check the political. However, the political should not be abandoned, because it is needed by the ethical.

The politics of suspicion

Levinas begins *Totality and Infinity* by asking whether or not we are duped by morality. Considering the unchanging conditions of man making war on man, the century of genocide in which we live, and the repeated atrocities, is morality not meaningless? According to Levinas, morality can only have meaning when it has its own justification, when it is not absorbed by ontology and politics, when it exists outside of the violence of ontology and politics. In the terms of *Totality and Infinity*, ethics will have meaning ‘only if the certitude of peace dominates the evidence of war’. Levinas responds that we are not duped by morality. He finds the certitude of peace in the non-ontological saying, in proximity, and in the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The primordial relationship with the Other is originally peaceful. Ethics has its own justification.

On equal footing is the question: are we duped by politics? Is it worthwhile to theorize about politics, or is the existent regime, the one that is the strongest, always the best regime? Can there be another foundation for politics or does politics carry its own justification? In Levinasian terms, is it possible to construct a politics which maintains the ethical relationship with the Other, one which does not reduce the Other, but preserves alterity? To paraphrase Levinas, the crucial question is not ‘To be or not to be?’ but rather: How can the state be justified in the face of the Other?

Despite the importance of the political question, Levinas very rarely discusses politics at length. This neglect is best understood in relation to his suspicion of traditional ethics. Levinas is acknowledged to be one of the foremost ethical thinkers of our century. Yet, as Robert Bernasconi pointed out in a recent essay, Levinas rarely confronts traditional ethical thought, including the ethics of Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, or Hegel.
Like many other 19th- and 20th-century philosophers (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault and Derrida come to mind), Levinas harbors a deep suspicion toward traditional ethical theories. Why would such a highly regarded philosopher of ethics choose largely to ignore the ethical tradition? Levinas disregards most of the tradition because his critique of ethics is radical, that is, he attacks the roots of the tradition. Levinas claims that the ethical tradition subordinates ethics to ontology; ethics is derived from an eminent being or the contemplation of an autonomous individual. Levinas, on the other hand, provides ethics with a justification beyond ontology. Thus, he confronts the ontological foundations of traditional ethical theories, but rarely the theories themselves. Levinas, the great ethical thinker of our century, is more of a metaphysician than an ethicist.

Levinas’ attitude toward traditional political thought parallels his attitude toward traditional ethical thought. Levinas rarely confronts the great thinkers of the Western political tradition. For example, he never discusses, at length, such prominent political thinkers as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, or Rousseau. And when he discusses thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza and Hegel, he emphasizes their metaphysical theories instead of their extensive political thought.

Just as he attacks the foundations of Western ethical thought, Levinas attacks the underlying presupposition of Western political thought; namely, that political thought begins with the self. Levinas’ critique of Western political thought is best applied to modern political thinkers such as Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke, who base their political thought on self-preservation. For instance, Hobbes claims that men’s actions are determined by desires and the highest desire is self-preservation, or, in Spinoza’s terminology, the *conatus essendi*, the effort to exist. According to Hobbes, to ensure self-preservation, men desire security and its corollary, power. To ensure power, men must have more power. Since other men also ceaselessly desire power, each is an enemy to the others. In such a world there can be no science, no knowledge, no arts, ‘no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.’30 To ameliorate this war of all against all, a social contract is agreed upon, under which individuals lay down their rights to ensure peace. Politics is established to preserve self-interest. Levinas argues that any politics, such as Hobbes’, which begins with self-preservation, subordinates ethics to politics. Instead of the originary peace necessary for ethics, there is an originary war which is not destroyed by the social contract, but is only concealed. As Pascal wrote:
They have used concupiscence as best as they could for the general good; but it is nothing but pretense and a false image of charity; for at bottom it is simply a form of hatred.

Men have contrived and extracted from concupiscence excellent rules of administration, morality and justice. But in reality this vile bedrock of man, this figmentum malum, is only covered, not removed.31

Levinas’ critique of the foundations of political thought changes the very nature of politics. A politics based on the battle between autonomous selves, like Hobbes’, is a negative politics whose primary purpose is to constrain individual desires. Levinas, on the other hand, insists that politics must have a positive role. Politics must serve ethics.

The occidental ethic always proceeds from the fact that the other is a limitation for me. Hobbes says you can come directly to philosophy from this mutual hatred. Thus we could attain a better society without love for the other, in which the other is taken into account. That would be a politics that could lead to ethics. I believe, on the contrary, that politics must be controlled by ethics: the other concerns me.32

Although Levinas is suspicious of the Western political tradition, his thought is not apolitical as some have charged. His philosophy begins and ends with politics. For example, Peperzak argues that ‘the point of orientation and the background of all other questions’ in Totality and Infinity is ‘the question of how the violence that seems inherent to all politics (and thus also to history) can be overcome by true peace’.33 Politics is also a necessary step that Levinas’ ethical thought must take. Just as the an-archical saying requires the ontological said, an-archical ethics requires politics. The mutually interdependent relationship between the saying and the said serves as the paradigm for the relationship between ethics and politics. Ethics, which is a manifestation of the saying, has been traditionally subordinated by politics, a manifestation of the said. A resuscitation of the ethical is needed to check the political. However, the political should not be abandoned. Ethics requires the political to be universalized into laws and institutions.

Ethics to politics: the Third

Levinas’ philosophy champions the ethical relationship with the Other, but this is not the end of his philosophy. According to Levinas, the Other drags the ego out of its selfish lair, and leads to ethics. However, Levinas worries that the face-to-face relationship with the Other will devolve into another selfish lair. In this relationship, the ego can become infatuated with the Other to the point of ignoring all others. As Kant wrote,
‘complaisance toward those with whom we are concerned is very often injustice towards others who stand outside our little circle’.34 This embrace of lovers, as Levinas calls it, is interrupted by the appearance of another person, ‘the Third’ (le tiers).

The Third occupies an equivocal position. It is ‘other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and not simply his fellow’.35 If the ego is confronted with one Other, then ethics is straightforward: the ego is infinitely, asymmetrically, and concretely responsible for the Other. However, with the appearance of the Third, the ego’s attention is divided, no longer is it only intimate with the Other. Responsibility assumes a new appearance.

With the appearance of the Third, a host of new questions arise. Are both others the Other? How can the ego be infinitely responsible for more than one Other? Which Other should receive its attention first? What if one Other makes war on the other Other? Can the ego defend the Other against attacks from an-Other? If so, can the ego use violence, even kill an-Other in defense of the Other?

The appearance of the Third invariably extends the ego’s responsibility because its appearance is not necessarily an empirical fact, nor does it come chronologically after the exposure to the Other. Simultaneously, the ego is confronted with the face of the Other and the Third. ‘Because there are more than two people in the world, we invariably pass from the ethical perspective of alterity to the ontological perspective of totality. There are always at least three persons.’36 Thus, in the face of the Other, the ego is confronted with the Third. As Burggraeve writes, ‘in the meeting with another person’s naked Face, I become confronted with all other people, who are just as much in need of my help as the one who stands before me’.37 The ego can no longer prioritize those in proximity, it must give attention to all. The ego’s dis-interested-ness is now a concern for world peace.

However, it is impossible to have a face-to-face relationship with each member of humanity. Those far away can only be reached indirectly. Thus, the appearance of the Third extends the anarchical responsibility for the Other into the realm of the said, ushering in the latent birth of language, justice and politics.

The anarchical relationship with the Other is the pre-linguistic world of the saying. Language is unnecessary to respond to the Other. The Third, however, demands an explanation. ‘In its frankness it [language] refuses the clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness and meaning and turns into laughter or cooing. The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other – language is justice.’38 The appearance of the Third also opens up the dimension of justice. Judgements must be made. The ego must compare incomparable Others. ‘It is consequently necessary to weigh, to think, to judge, in comparing the incomparable. The
interpersonal relation I establish with the Other, I must also establish with other men. Therefore, Levinas distinguishes the ethical relationship with the Other from justice which involves three or more people.

Finally, the Third introduces the realm of politics. The ego’s infinite responsibility must be extended to all humanity, no matter how far off. Ethics must be universalized and institutionalized to affect the others.

To the extent that someone else’s Face brings us in relation with a third party, My metaphysical relation to the Other is transformed into a We, and works toward a State, institutions and laws which form the source of universality.

Before examining the relationship between ethics and politics, several implications of Levinas’ move from the Other to the Third need to be addressed. First, does the ego still have an infinite responsibility for the Other? In Otherwise than Being, Levinas defines justice as ‘the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question’. However, in the same work, he also claims that ‘in no way is justice a degradation of obsession, a degeneration of the for-the-other, a diminution, a limitation of anarchic responsibility’. How can these conflicting statements be resolved? Either justice limits the responsibility for the Other or it does not. The contradiction is resolved by considering, once again, Levinas’ theoretical emphasis on the separation and oscillation between the saying and the said. Ethics is found in the an-archical realm of the saying, while justice is a part of the totalizing realm of the said. Ethics and justice exist in both relation and separation. Neither can be reduced to the other. Thus, justice cannot diminish the infinite responsibility for the Other: the ego remains infinitely, asymmetrically and concretely responsible for the Other. This responsibility always maintains its potency. However, the ego is also invariably transported by the Third into the realm of the said. The ego must weigh its obligations. It is not possible to respond infinitely to all Others. The original demand for an infinite responsibility remains, but it cannot be fulfilled. Ethics must be universalized, but in attempting to do so, the ego has already reneged on its responsibility for the Other. Thus, Levinas’ peculiar formulation; justice is un-ethical and violent. ‘Only justice can wipe it [ethical responsibility] away by bringing this giving-oneself to my neighbor under measure, or moderating it by thinking in relation to the third and the fourth, who are also my “others,” but justice is already the first violence.’

The ‘logic’ of separation between the saying and the said can also be applied to the question of self-interest and reciprocity. The realm of the said is a synchronic world where all of humanity, including the ego, is co-present. In this realm, the ego is bound by the same institutions, the same justice, and the same laws as all the others. In this world, the ego can reasonably expect to be treated with reciprocity from the others.
‘Subjectivity is a citizen with all the duties and rights.’ However, the reciprocity found in the world of the said does not negate the prior asymmetry of the an-archical relationship with the Other. Since the Third is known through the Other, reciprocity is only a secondary movement. An-archical responsibility remains.

Justice can be established only if I, always evaded from the concept of the ego, always desituated and divested of being, always in non-reciprocable relationship with the other, always for the other, can become an other like the others. Is not the Infinite which enigmatically commands me, commanding and not commanding, from the other, also the turning of the I into ‘like the others,’ for which it is important to concern oneself and take care? My lot is important but it is still out of my responsibility that my salvation has meaning.

Finally, the relationship with the Third begs the question of violence in the name of justice. Can the ego with its infinite responsibility for the Other actually harm an-Other to protect the Other? While never explicitly condoning the use of physical force, Levinas insists that the ego must defend the Other.

Surely, humility is the greatest of virtues – one must be as dust which becomes trampled down. But justice is necessary to preserve the Others from evil ones. One cannot forgive violence in the place of those who have undergone it or died. This is the limit of substitution. To make peace in the world implies justice.

However, Levinas does explicitly grant that force is necessary to punish transgressors, but this punishment must be tempered by the ethical relationship with the Other. Punishment is necessary or evil will run rampant. ‘The extermination of evil by violence means that evil is taken seriously and that the possibility of infinite pardon tempts us to infinite evil. . . . Without a hell for evil, nothing in the world would make sense any longer.’ In his commentary on the lex talionis, the eye for an eye, Levinas describes how this punishment is necessary but must be tempered. The passage seems clear enough:

He who kills a man shall be put to death. He who kills a beast shall make it good, life for a life. When a man causes a disfigurement in his neighbor, as he has done it shall be done to him, fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. . . . You shall have one law for the sojourner and for the native; for I am the Lord your God.

Even in such a strict commandment, Levinas finds a ‘humanizing of justice’. By placing the passage in context, Levinas concurs with the Talmudic Doctors: ‘the principle stated by the Bible here, which appears to be so cruel, seeks only justice.’ This justice is possible only by tempering the violence against evil.
Violence calls up violence, but we must put a stop to this chain reaction. That is the nature of justice. . . . Humanity is born in man to the extent that he manages to reduce a mortal offence to the level of a civil lawsuit, to the extent that punishing becomes a question of putting right what can be put right and re-educating the wicked. Justice without passion is the only thing man must possess. He must also have justice without killing.51

How can an eye for an eye be translated into a softening of justice? Levinas, following the Talmudic tradition, claims that an eye for an eye refers to a fine. This ‘fine’ may be the only possible form of justice, but it leaves open the way to the rich who can afford the fine. ‘They can easily pay for the broken teeth, the gouged-out eyes and the fractured limbs left around them.’52 The demand for a tempering of justice must be expressed in the harsh words of the *lex talionis*, so that the rich do not commit evil in good conscience. ‘Yes, eye for eye. Neither all eternity, nor all the money in the world, can heal the outrage done to man.’53

In conclusion, the Third both extends and limits the responsibility for the Other. The ego’s responsibility must be extended beyond the Other, to the Third, even to all of humanity. Further, the Third necessitates an extension of the ego’s an-archical responsibility into the realm of the said, that is, responsibility must be made concrete in language, justice and politics. Conversely, the Third also limits the responsibility for the Other. Since the Third forces the ego to choose between Others, the ego’s responsibility for the Other must be tempered by its responsibility for others. Moreover, the Other may behave in a way which negates the ego’s infinite obligations. The Other can become an enemy.

If your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right, and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong.54

Levinas uses the Third to move from the an-archical realm of ethics to the totalizing realm of language, justice and politics. Levinas is not only interested in the ethical relationship with the Other, he is a social and political thinker. However, by placing his emphasis on the ethical relationship with the Other, Levinas has radically altered the relationship between ethics, justice and politics.

**Ethics and politics: Hebraism and Hellenism**

We should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so . . . along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’ but
of those close to me, who are also my neighbors. I'd call such a defence a politics, but a politics that's ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics.55

Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justification. Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. 'I think there's a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.'56

Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny, absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore 'the independence of ethics in relation to history' and trace 'a limit to the comprehension of the real by history'.57 Levinas finds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other.

The norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman. If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the first philosophy.58

At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transfixed into language, justice and politics. 'As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.59 Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others.

We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other's right as expressed by his face, un-face human beings, sternly reducing each one's uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let universality rule. Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state to render justice.60
Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler and his followers.’

Both ethics and politics have their own justification. The justification for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justification for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for the liberal state.

The Levinasian state

According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the beginning of all violence. In the realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is universalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universalization of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the institutions of the state treat the Other as an interchangeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed to ethics.

For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when everyone submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other.

Vigilance against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other.

In order for everything to run along smoothly and freely, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each, for each, before each. As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other which are caused by the functioning – albeit reasonable – of the hierarchy.
The state must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds just such a self-critical state in the modern liberal state. The liberal state ‘always asks itself whether its own justice really is justice’.64

What qualities does the liberal state possess that make it self-critical? First, there is the freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice.

You know the prophets of the bible, they come and say to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn’t do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king and he tells him. In the liberal state, it’s the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role.65

Second, in the liberal state, the leader is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees humanity through the Other’s eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. ‘The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if the divine word enters into it; the prince is educated in this knowledge.’66

However, for Levinas, the most important component of the liberal state is its call for a ‘permanent revolution’.67 The Levinasian liberal state is always trying to improve itself, trying to be more just. It is ‘a rebellion that begins where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins’.68 Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical.

There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection. Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.69

**Conclusion: an-archy and justice**

Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’,70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other.
Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, justice and politics.

Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For example, in *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’

Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other. Levinasian heteronomic political thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions. Neither tradition should dominate.

The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) ... that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence. Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure.

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**Notes**

1 I am indebted to Cecil Eubanks, Charles Bigger, Peter Petrakis, Ellis Sandoz, James Stoner and Randy LeBlanc for their insightful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1998 Southern Political Science Association convention in Atlanta.

2 For the sake of consistency, ‘Other’ will be capitalized in this essay whenever it refers to the unique other person, who approaches the ego in the face-to-face relationship. Likewise, ‘Same’ will be capitalized when it is used, like Heidegger’s Being, to refer to an ultimate neuter concept, which encompasses all of ‘reality’.


4 ‘The Third’ will be capitalized because it refers to a specific other person, an Other, who by pure circumstance stands outside the original relationship between the ego and the Other. The Third as (an-)Other demands the same infinite responsibility as the Other.


6 For Plato’s distinction between eros and need, see *Symposium*, 189c–93 and *Phaedrus*, 265.


14 It is on this question of symmetry that Levinas’s thought decisively breaks with Buber’s I–thou relationship. In Buber’s formulation the I approaches and speaks first to the Thou, as if the I were investing the Thou with the


17 Peperzak, To the Other, p. 221.


19 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 78.

20 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 48.

21 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 38.

22 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 49.

23 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 77.

24 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 44.

25 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 45.

26 On this point, I am indebted to Susan A. Handelman’s excellent exegesis of Levinas’s method, especially as it relates to the dichotomies of philosophy/non-philosophy and Greek/Jew (Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin, Scholem, and Levinas [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991], pp. 233–49 and 263–75).


28 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 22.


33 Peperzak, To the Other, p. 122. Also, Simon Critchley wrote: ‘I would go further and claim that, for Levinas, ethics is ethical for the sake of politics
that is, for the sake of a new conception of the organization of political
space.... My claim is that politics provides the continual horizon of
Levinasian ethics’ (The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 223).

34 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the
Sublime, trans. J. T. Goldthwait (London: University of California Press,
p. 66.

35 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 157.
37 Burggraeve, ‘The Ethical Basis for a Humane Society’, p. 36.
38 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 213.
39 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 90.
40 This distinction between ethics and justice was not elucidated until Levinas’
later writings. ‘In Totality and Infinity I used the word “justice” for ethics,
for the relationship between two people. I spoke of “justice”, although now
“justice” is for me something which is a calculation, which is knowledge,
and which supposes politics; it is inseparable from the political. It is
something which I distinguish from ethics, which is primary. However, in
Totality and Infinity, the word “ethical” and the word “just” are the same
word, the same question, the same language’ (Levinas et al., ‘Paradox of
Morality’, p. 171).

41 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 300.
42 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 157.
43 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 159.
46 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, pp. 160–1.
47 Quoted in Burggraeve, ‘The Ethical Basis for a Humane Society’, p. 56.
48 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘As Old as the World?’, in Nine Talmudic Readings,
trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1990), p. 87.
49 Leviticus 24: 17–22.
50 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘An Eye for an Eye’, in Difficult Freedom: Essays on
Judaism, trans. Seán Hand (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University

52 Levinas, ‘An Eye for an Eye’, p. 147. Levinas is far from clear on how the
lex talionis represents a fine. However, this argument is common among
Old Testament scholars. See, for example, William W. Hallo, ‘Leviticus’, in
The Torah: A Modern Commentary (New York: Union of American
Hebrew Congregations, 1981), pp. 939–40. As Levinas is quick to point
out, the lex talionis is an extension of justice beyond the tribal system to all
foreigners. (See Leviticus 24: 22.) Cf. Plato who draws a long litany of
distinctions between citizens and strangers (for example, Laws, 850,
865–79).

61 Levinas, ‘As Old as the World?’, p. 87.
63 Levinas, ‘Transcendence and Height’, p. 23.
67 This discussion is indebted to Burggraeve’s excellent analysis (Burggraeve, ‘The Ethical Basis for a Humane Society’, pp. 52–5).
71 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 21.